The commerce clause: the eclipse & rebirth (& eclipse ?) of congressional power

1. doctrines obstructing congress’ power to regulate commerce (& national police power), 1890-1937

(1) distinction between production (manufacturing) & commerce (United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 1895; Hammer v. Dagenhart 1918; Carter v. Carter Coal Company 1936)

(2) distinction between “direct” & “indirect” effects (United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 1895; Carter v. Carter Coal Company 1936; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 1935)

(3) distinction between “harmful” & “harmless” products (Hammer v. Dagenhart 1918)

(4) doctrine of “dual federalism” (concurrent power theory/ powers of congress limited by powers reserved to states by 10^th amendment: Hammer v. Dagenhart 1918; Carter v. Carter Coal Company 1936; United States v. Butler 1936) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Butler

(5) congress cannot outlaw child labor through taxing power (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.1922) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bailey_v._Drexel_Furniture_Co.

2. doctrines supporting congress’ power to regulate commerce

(1) congress can prohibit interstate shipment of lottery tickets (Champion v. Ames 1903;)[beginning of “national police power”] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Champion_v._Ames

(2) doctrine of “intermingling” (Southern Railway Co. v. U.S. 1911)

(3) doctrine of “stream of commerce” (Swift & Co. v. U.S. 1905; Stafford v. Wallace 1922) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swift_&_Co._v._United_States

(4) doctrine of “burden on interstate commerce” (Shreveport Rate Case 1914)

3. cases restoring congressional power to regulate commerce: the “New Deal Consensus”

(1) NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin (1937): rejects “rigid” distinction between production & commerce, and “degree of effect” test of Carter; creates “class of activities” test

(2) U.S. v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941): overrules Hammer, endorses national police power, no distinction between harmful & harmless goods/ 10^th Amendment “merely a truism”/ rejects “Marshall’s dictum”/Congress may regulate anything that has a “substantial effect” upon commerce/ end of “Dual Federalism” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._v._Darby_Lumber_Co.

(3) Wickard v. Filburn (1942): finally disposes of production-commerce, direct-indirect tests/ confirms “class of activities” test http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wickard_v._Filburn

(4) Heart of Atlanta Motel v. Katzenbach (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)—commerce power supports Civil Rights Act of 1964 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katzenbach_v._McClung

(5) Perez v. U.S. (1971): confirms broad powers of Congress, to regulate any “class of activities” (as defined by Congress) that “affects” commerce/ maximum judicial deference to Congress [see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. 1964] http://www.course-notes.org/US_Gov_and_Politics/Case_Briefs/Perez_v_United_States

4. Attempted Revival of the 10^th Amendment

(1) National League of Cities v. Usery (1976): Congress can’t regulate “states qua states”, e.g. set minimum wages for state workers under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_League_of_Cities_v._Usery

(2) Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985): Usery overruled http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garcia_v._San_Antonio_Metropolitan_Transit_Authority

(3) Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991): Congress can’t prohibit mandatory retirement age for elected state judges http://www.course-notes.org/US_Gov_and_Politics/Case_Briefs/Gregory_v_Ashcroft

(4) U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton (1995) States cannot impose term limits on eligibility for election to Congress http://www.course-notes.org/US_Gov_and_Politics/Case_Briefs/US_Term_Limits_Inc_v_Thornton

5. A revisionist View of Congress’ power

(1) N.Y. v. United States (1992) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_v._United_States

(2) U.S. v. Lopez (1995) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Lopez

(3)